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The history of agriculture 1 s interest in foreign trade during the 20th cen-
tury is a study in contrast . We began the century as a major agricultural 
exporting nation. Following World War I , however , agricultural trade fell 
off; but our interest in agricultural trade d i d not . Throughout the 20's agri-
culture was searching for programs to solve its domestic price and income 
problems in foreign markets . The McNary - Haugen proposals, the export-
debenture plan, etc . , looked overseas for the ultimate solution . This was 
natural since the loss of these export markets was a primary cause of the 
depressed prices and incomes . In the "thirties , " however, the whole econ-
omy was in a depression. Our attention shifted. We developed programs 
with little or no concern for export markets . Thus , for a period of 20 to 
25 years with the excepti on of a few commodity groups, American agricul-
ture lost sight of the rest of the world . We fed a large part of the world 
during and immediately follow ing World War II and we expanded our ship-
ments aga i n in the Korean action, but these were exceptional circumstances. 
W e made little or no effort to regain our previous export position . 
Then in 1953-54, stocks began to build up . We again turned our atten-
tion to the rest of the world as a poss ible outlet for the price and income 
problems we faced here at home . Congress responded with Public Law 
480 , the Agricultural Trade Development and Ass i stance Act of 1954 . 
Partly in response to activities under this law American agriculture today 
is more informed about and more interested in world agriculture and agri-
cultural trade than at any time in histo r y . The inclus ion of this topic on 
your program is. indicative of that interest. Before we beg i n to discuss 
issues in foreign trade let me talk for a few minutes about some basic trade 
principles . 
Some Principles -- Comparative Advantage and All That 
We trade for a great many reasons . One of the most obvious reasons is 
to obtain goods that aren't available here in our country or that could be pro-
duced at home only at a prohibi t ive cost. But if this were the only reason 
for trade we probably could get along without i t . In a country as large and 
as diverse as ours , many of the goods that we can obtain only through trade 
are goods that we could do w i thout or goods for which we could develop suit-
able , if not entirely satisfactory, substitutes . W e have done so during war-
time . The major reason for trade , however , i s that it enables us to obtain 
more goods at less cost than would otherwise be the case . In other words, 
trade permits us to enjoy higher levels of liv ing than we could enjoy other-
wise . 
Presented at the Annual Agr i cultural Extens i on Conference , St. Paul, 
Minnesota , on December 12 , 1963 . 
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Every beginning economics student goes through the logical exercise of 
visualizing the gains in production that will take place in a village, a city or 
a state, as a result of division of labor. Thus, we use the illustration of the 
shoemaker concentrating on making shoes. But he is able to exchange shoes 
in excess of his own needs for other necessities and luxuries which in turn 
are produced by other specialists. Because of the increased efficiency that 
division of labor brings about, a society so organized can produce goods in 
far greater volume and variety than would be true if each producer operated 
to meet his own needs in all kinds of goods. 
This kind of argument is so obvious that I don 1 t think it needs saying in 
a society such as ours; but it is strange indeed how many of us seem to rebel 
when these very same principles are e;xtended to include the whole world. 
In other words, when we talk about the principles of trade. When viewed in 
a purely economic setting, the gains to be achieved from specialization and 
division of labor are every bit as real in an international setting as they are 
when you viewed it within the confines of a village or a single nation. 
Those of you who recall your "horrifying experiences" in Ag. Econ. I 
and II many years ago, may remember that the next step in this logical 
exercise was to discuss the principle of comparative advantage. I'd like 
to illustrate this principle with some numbers, but we haven't time. How-
ever, I do want to cite its major implications. The principle of comparative 
advantage suggests that it pays countries to specialize in the production of 
those commodities for which their comparative or relative advantage is 
greatest. We see this in our own country. If we look at yields of wheat 
and corn we find that in both cases, yields are much higher in the Corn 
Belt than they are in the Plains. But, the comparative advantage -- the 
relative difference in yields -- is much greater for corn than it is for wheat. 
Because of the operation of the principle of comparative advantage, we spec-
ialize in the production of corn in the Corn Belt and we specialize in the pro-
duction of wheat on the Plains. As a result, we and the producers in both 
areas are better off. The degree of specialization that we observe probably 
would be even greater than it is today were it not for some of the distorting 
effects of government programs. This same kind of specialization that 
takes place within our country also can exist and does exist to a degree 
among countries. ' 
We haven't time to delve more deeply into the topic of comparative ad-
vantage but there are two ideas associated with it that are fundamental to 
the understanding of trade. First, the total production to be achie'ved by 
practicing production specialization and trade according to the principle of 
comparative advantage is greater than it would be otherwise. Secondly, 
the benefits of that greater total production accrue to all of the participants 
in the trade process. This point is particularly crucial and it's one that we 
may tend to forget. It says that no matter how efficient, no matter how pro-
ductive a country may become, it is impossible to become so efficient that 
it cannot benefit from trade. 
Let me make one final point while we're talking about basic economic 
principles. Trade, by definition, is a two way street. It is an exchange of 
one good for another. In our developed economies we no longer barter di-
rectly. Instead we use a medium of exchange -- money. As a result, we 
tend to get the impression that we can sell to the other fellow in exchange 
for money without taking any of his goods in return. But where does he 
get money? He gets mo~ey by exchanging his own goods or his own labor 
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in exchange for money. If we want to export, we are also going to have to 
import. We cannot continually exchange our goods for money or gold unless 
we are willing to buy goods from other countries so that they in turn may ac-
quire money and gold. Thus, if we want to export we must also import. 
The trade principles that I have been describing here are purely economic 
in nature. They hold exactly only in the relatively ideal world of economic 
theory. Nevertheless, the principles themselves are applicable to world 
trade issues as we view them today. But economic considerations are nei-
ther the beginning nor the end of world trade questions. Political, social, 
and military considerations also are a part of the picture. At times, non-
economic considerations may be the primary ones. As we illustrate below 
one cannot realistically appraise foreign trade issues from an economic 
standpoint alone. 
Furthermore, when discussing trade and many related problems, we 
must recognize that we must start from where we are. For a variety of rea-
sons, production and trade have not been organized according to the principle 
of comparative advantage. Thus, when we argue that society as a whole will 
benefit from freer trade, we must recognize that this does not mean every 
individual in society will benefit. Investors and workers who currently have 
their money invested or currently are employed in a protected industry, for 
example, are not going to benefit from the removal of protection although 
you and I as consumers will. In the long run, of course, we would hope that 
investors would put their money to use in industries where we do have com-
parative advantage and that workers would find more productive employment 
in such industries. But there are certain frictions to the movement of re-
sources. You cannot remake the world overnight as you would like to have 
it in an ideal situation. The point we should keep. in mind is that we should 
be working toward rather than away from freer trade whenever possible. 
Some Issues 
Until we reach the millennium when world-wide free trade is a reality, 
government is always going to be an important force in determining both the 
volume and the terms of trade. Government has entered the trade picture 
for a variety of reasons. One of the major early reasons was to earn rev-
enue. At that time we employed tariffs largely to provide government in-
come. Government may regulate trade to insure certain levels of minimum 
self-sufficiency in time of war. It may restrict trade to protect infant in-
dustries or for other reasons resulting from domestic political pressures. 
In some cases, government may regulate trade to insure the effectiveness 
of domestic economic policies. This is very important in the case of ag-
riculture. In modern developed economies agricultural trade is much less 
a function of trade policy determination than it is an indirect result of do-
mestic agricultural policy. 
In the United States, we are extremely prone to ignore the role of gov-
ernment in our own agricultural trade regarding both exports and imports. 
Let's talk first about exports. Each time I read a report citing a new record 
volume of agricultural exports I have a strong desire to write a letter to the 
editor asking him to give credit where credit is due. The official reports 
from the USDA are far better in this regard then they were a few years ago, 
but the glowing reports is sued by the trade and those generally published in 
the popular press, fail to recognize adequately the role of government in 
the total trade process. In 1962, for example, we exported $5 billion worth 
of agricultural goods. Of this total, $1. 5 billion, or thirty percent, was fi-
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nanced under special government programs, primarily PL 480. During re-
cent years approximately 70 percent of the record exports of wheat have 
been under PL 480 and completely financed by government. The soybean 
industry often is cited as an industry that has succeeded very effectively 
without the help of government. Yet, about 50 to 60 percent of all the veg-
etable oils exported from this country are exported under PL 480. I'm 
not condemning this, I'm merely stating it as a fact that should be recog-
nized when we talk about record exports of agricultural commodities. In 
addition to the exports that are financed wholly by government, an additional 
20 percent of our total agricultural sales are made pas sible only with the 
assistance of export payments on the part of the government. What share 
of the credit for the expanding U. S. trade in agricultural commodities goes 
to the government and what share of the credit belongs to the trade is any-
body's guess. Both have worked hard and successfully, but nobody should 
claim that either side deserves all the credit. 
The government's influence on agricultural trade is not restricted to 
the exporting side. All countries use a variety of devices to affect agricul-
tural trends. They include: import levies, skimming charges, quotas, 
health and sanitation regulations and exchange controls to name a few. The 
effects of these measures on the volume and the terms of trade are at least 
equal to the effects of subsidies and the other devices employed by export-
ers. Our attention is all too often directed to what we're doing to try to get 
more sales; we don't see what the other countries are doing to try to re-
strict sales. Furthermore, our attention tends to focus on tariffs. As a 
matter of fact, recent studies by the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trades -- The GATT -- and other agencies have revealed that the non-
tariff barriers (i.e., such things as quotas, sanitary regulations, exchange 
controls and a whole host of hidden devices) are much more important in 
restricting agricultural trade than tariffs. Unfortunately, we in the United 
States cannot claim to be innocent in this regard. 
I want to discuss one more point before closing this section. Let me 
call your attention to the often misused and poorly conceived idea of world 
price. You are all aware that subsidies are required to sell U. S. wheat 
or U. S. cotton in world markets because domestic prices are above world 
prices. Certainly this is true when we think of world prices as the price 
at which goods exchange in world trade. But all too often the term world 
price is used as if it implies some sort of a free market price determined 
in a worldwide market where everything is free of political manipulation 
except here in the United States. This simply is not so. I doubt if any 
major agricultural commodity entering world trade is marketed under con-
ditions even remotely resembling a free market. The world price of wheat 
today, for example, is "qUite largely a function of the size of the subsidy 
paid by exporters such as the United States, the levies charged by importers, 
the level of domestic price support in exporting and importing countries, the 
degree of production control V'arious countries follow and the conditions im-
posed by the International Wheat Agreement. I don't know whether the so-
called free market world price of wheat is above or below the price at 
which wheat currently is being traded. I'm not even certain that it makes 
much difference whether we do know. But, if the present world price of 
wheat is even close to such a free market world price, it's purely coinci-
dence. 
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This suggests the major issue in agricultural trade today. World trade 
in agricultural commodities has not been determined strictly by economic 
factors. It will not be determined largely by such factors for a long time 
to come. In the developing countries export and import programs designed 
to facilitate economic development and to regulate precarious balance-of-
payments situations will continue to exist. This will be so even if our PL 
480 and other food aid programs should disappear -- and that is not likely 
to happen. In developed countries the relatively low levels of agricultural 
prices and income is going to continue to constitute a major domestic eco-
nomic and political problem. No government in the developed world appears 
to be willing or able to forego support programs designed to alleviate its 
agricultural price and income problems. Yet all such programs are in-
herently in conflict with the generally expressed desire for freer trade. 
Despite this fact there has seldom been any serious attempt to reduce the 
conflict in the development of farm policies. 
The conflict between domestic farm policies and trade has never been 
more clearly demonstrated than in our current debate with the Common 
Market. I want to develop this point somewhat although anything we say 
will be too brief to properly deal with that topic. The most significant 
feature of the debate and I believe the one least well accepted by the Amer-
ican and European public is that both sides face the same fundamental eco-
nomic, social and political problems in the agricultural sector. In each 
case, the broad problem is one of coping with a situation where agricultural 
productive capacity is expanding more rapidly than needs. And, because 
of the failure or the inability to adjust resources adequately agricultural in-
comes tend to fall below those in the rest of society. In the absence of gov-
ernment programs, both here and in Europe, agricultural incomes would 
lag those of their urban neighbors to still a greater degree than has been 
true in the past. 
Surprisingly enough when looked at in broad terms, (i.e., in terms 
of the basic principles employed rather than specific programs}, the Com-
mon Market and the United States are attempting to solve their agricultural 
difficulties, or maybe we should say alleviate their price and income symp-
toms, in about the same fashion. In both the United States and the Common 
Market, direct market intervention, that is, direct price supports, are 
limited primarily to major crops. Both the United States and the Common 
Market have elected to support farm income by supporting farm prices. 
Both the United States and the Common Market are going to try to maintain 
the desired level of prices by restricting the amounts of products flowing 
through the market. lt1 s on this last point, -- in the devices employed to 
restrict the quantity of products going through the market -- that we differ 
significantly from the Common Market. We're an exporting nation. There-
fore, in order to control marketings, we have had to employ a variety of 
programs such as storage, attempts at production control, and restriction 
of imports. The Common Market is an importing area for many commod-
ities and particularly for grain which is at the heart of its agriculture. As 
a result it can restrict marketings for the most part simply by restricting 
imports. It doesn't have to go through the expensive process of storing 
commodities. It doesn't have to adopt a politically sensitive program of 
domestic supply control. But the Common Market is operating a supply 
management program in much the same sense as has been proposed in the 
United States. It's a program where the restrictive effects of management 
are felt primarily by producers outside the Common Market countries. 
Naturally, this makes it much easier to gain political acceptance. 
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The impact of the Common Agricultural policy on imports of agricultural 
commodities will not be known for some years to come. Even projections 
are difficult to make because the Common Market countries have not been able 
to agree on many crucial issues. The most important is the price level toward 
which their grain policy will be directed. But insofar as our discussion today 
is concerned, one issue is abundantly clear. The Common Market does intend 
to protect it agriculture to at least as great a d~,gree as we in the United States 
and at the present time, all indications are that it will be to an even greater 
degree. For the most part, it is going to do this through actions taken at the 
border. Whether or not the Common Market agricultural policy is going to 
be more restrictive than the individual policies that preceded it is open to 
question. It is abundantly clear, however, that the generally expressed desire 
for freer trade among nations has not been a major factor in the determination 
of domestic agricultural policy in the Common Market. In all fairness we 
must add that neither has this desire had much influence on the making of 
domestic agricultural policy in the United States. 
I want to return to the Common Market issue in just a moment, but let 
me touch briefly on two other major trade issues. The first is the "on again-
off again" question of trade with communist countries. Whether or not we 
should trade is largely a political question. From an economic standpoint, 
there is absolutely no question that such trade should take place. In any 
case, I don't want to argue this specifk point. This is a problem for the 
politicians. What I do want to mention briefly is the longer term implica-
tions. Many irresponsible statements have been made regarding the impact 
that such trade might have on agricultural policy in the United States. Among 
the most dangerous and them ost erroneous of such statements is that this 
trade has solved or will solve the so-called surplus problem of American ag-
riculture. Trade with communist countries may relieve the surplus problem 
somewhat but it will not solve it. Even with the current projected levels of 
sales to Russia, about half of our wheat exports during the current fiscal 
year will still have to move under PL 480 and all other sales including those 
to Russia require an export subsidy. Furthermore, sales to Russia will 
reduce surplus stocks as much as is expected only because we currently are 
restricting production to a very great degree and at considerable expense to 
taxpayers. But, even if all these things weren't true, -- and they are true, 
--what assurance do we have that the possibilities for such sales will con-
tinue? What assurance do we have that this is more than a one shot opera-
tion? Do we really know how much of the current shortage in Russia is due 
to bad weather? No one seems to be able to make any positive statements 
about the future in this regard. We should also remember that the Russians 
cannot and will not continue to buy grain at this year's level unless they can 
increase exports of other goods. Even communist countries must be con-
cerned about balance of payments and they must recognize that gold supplies 
are limited. I- think the biggest danger that America faces from the proposed 
sale is that it is directing attention away from the basic American agricul-
tural problems an,d the need for reform in the policies we employ to cope 
with them. The current tendencies to propose policies that would have no 
other effect than to build up stocks again is one indication of this. 
The third issue I want to touch on briefly is that of beef imports in the 
United States. For some of you, I suspect this is the major foreign trade 
issue of interest to groups in your county at the present time. It may have 
diverted attention away from both the Common Market and the Russian grain 
sales. This is unfortunate because they should be dealt with together. We 
haven't time to go into the details, but let me make a few general comments. 
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First, the evidence that imports are a major factor in the present level 
of beef prices is unclear. Certainly increased imports have had some effect 
upon beef prices; but no one is sure how much. Even if imports are wholly 
responsible for the decline in beef prices, and I'm sure they are not, the in-
dustry's reaction to this raises some very interesting issue·s. Recall for a 
moment, the "chicken war." What was at stake? German poultry prices had 
fallen but why had they fallen? First, the Common Market forced the German 
government to remove an income subsidy that was being paid to German pro-
ducers. Secondly, low-priced imports of poultry from America were driv-
ing prices of poultry in the German market down. German farmers demanded 
relief and they got it. They got it by raising tariffs so the American poultry 
could not compete so effectively. 
What was our response? We said, first of all, that this was unfair. "This 
is not the way modern civilized countries behave in solving domestiC problems. 
Why should our farmers suffer because yours aren't efficient? Furthermore, 
your consumers are suffering because they're deprived of benefiting from the 
great technological progress we have made in poultry production. Why don't 
you follow a more rational policy? Why don't you encourage your producers 
to become .more efficient and in the meantime our producers and your produc-
ers will share this market? 11 
Now let's come back home. Last spring American beef prices began to 
fall. American producers got concerned. Where do they turn first to obtain 
relief? Naturally, to the restriction of those cheap imports. It's interesting, 
isn't it, how different things look when you turn from being an exporter to 
being an importer? We're suggesting the very same thing in beef policy that 
the Common Market has done in poultry policy. · 
Our cattle issue is much more complex than I have painted it; but so is 
the German poultry question. In both cases, I think I have painted the prin-
ciple issue correctly. If we really believe in freer trade and if we really 
want to help the cattlemen, it might be much better to accomplish this through 
a direct subsidy rather than to take the risk of doing exactly the thing we 1ve 
been trying to encourage the whole world not to do. 
All of the issues that I've discussed, the Common Market, sales to com-
munist countries, and bee£ imports point to a much broader issue. This is 
the basic conflict that exists between domestic agricultural policy and for-
eign trade. Can anything be done to reduce that conflict? 
The obvious solution is to eliminate domestic policies, but political 
reality suggests that this is impossible even if it were economically and 
socially desirable, which I doubt. However, agricultural policies both here 
and elsewhere have been derived with almost exclusive concern for domestic 
interests and little or no concern for their impact upon producers and con-
sumers in other countries. The resulting conflicts, such as the present 
one between the United States and the Common Market and the potential one 
between the United States and Australia if our bee£ producers are successful, 
threaten the attainment of broader economic and political cooperation through-
out the free world. Thus, it is essential that we devise some means for 
bringing international considerations more clearly into focus in the deter-
mination of domestic agricultural policies. 
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What I'm suggesting is that domestic agricultural policies of the future 
may have to be determined to an increasing extent within a framework of in-
ternational consultation and deliberation. This will not take place overnight. 
I for one do not even hold much hope for rapid agr~ement on international 
commodity agreements which is the most popular fad of the moment. But 
we must begin someplace and we must begin soon. One place to start might 
bE! to establish certain minimum ground rules to which nations would agree 
to abide in establishing domestic farm policy. As time passes, the rules 
could be extended and strengthened. 
Implications for Extension 
What- are the implications of all this for extension? The obvious one is 
that we can no longer deal with agricultural policies solely in terms of our 
problems here at homEj? We have to deal with them in a world wide setting. 
I suspect most of you are thinking "My gosh, it's so difficult now I can't 
understand it. Now he wants me to expand it to the whole world." Unfor-
tunately this may be true. These issues are extremely complex. Yet they 
and many more like them are going to become increasingly important during 
the months and years ahead. The educational needs in this and related areas 
in many respects are as great if not greater than in the rn,ore traditional vo-
cation-oriented subjects. Th~ dangers inherent in making decisions on beef 
imports or in making d~cisions regarding the "chicken war 11 involve much 
more than just agriculture. The actions we take may be the trigger that de-
termines the major course of free world relations for many years to come. 
For example, it!s disturbing that at the time the Berlin is sue was :ted hot and .. 
the Russians hadmissiles in Cuba, President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer 
were writing letters to each other concerning the tariff on chicken backs and 
necks. · 
Agriculture is important in determining world issues and agriculture 
therefore has a responsibility to understand what they're asking for when 
they ask for protection and all that goes with it. I'm not saying they shouldn 1t 
do it. They have to look out for their interests the same as anyone else, but 
they should understand all of the issues at' stake as much as possible. 
During the coming year a great deal of public interest is going to be gen-
erated on trade issues. Much more is going to be heard on the question of 
beef imports. The publicity s.urrounding the Kennedy round of trade negotia-
tions under the auspices of GATT is going to stir the people in your commun-
ity to ask even more questions of you about the Common Market, the Trade 
Expansion Act, tariff and non tariff barriers and so on. How can Extension 
respond to these questions? 
First of all, I think we must recognize that none of us are expert enough 
to fully understand issues as complicated as those we encounter in the field 
of foreign trade, but this should never stop us from making the attempt. The 
biggest problem you and I face as educators is to recognize when we have 
reached the limits of our understanding and to know where to turn for help. 
That help may come in many ways. One way is through published materials 
of various kinds. For example, in the area of foreign trade, the National 
Extension Policy Committee sponsored a publication of a series of six leaf-
lets on this topic about two years ago. Distribution of these leaflets could 
provide a good first step toward an intensive study of the principles and prob-
lems in foreign trade. Extension specialists and members of the resident 
staff may be able to recommend additional materials that you would find use-
- 9 -
ful. A second way of obtaining help is to call in an outside "expert" to discuss 
a problem of specific interest in your community, for example, beef imports 
at the present time. 
Let me make two comments in this regard. First, don't expect this expert 
to provide you with the answer on controversial issues. Most times there is 
no simple or unique answer. In fact, if he does provide you with the answer, 
treat him with suspicion! Secondly, don't think that we can run an effective ed-
ucational progx:am by running from one so-called hot issue to another. How-
ever, it ma.y be possible to turn the interest generated on a specific issue to 
advantage. For example, you might be able to use a meeting on beef imports 
to stimulate interest in a series of programs and discussions on principles of 
trade and related matters. Or, you might exploit the interest developed in 
last year 1 s wheat referendum to gain support for a seminar on policy making 
in a democratic society. 
What I'm suggesting with regard to all of these extremely complex and 
difficult issues is that we must strive for a more truly liberal flavor in our 
continuing education activities. We must attempt to help people understand 
more clearly the fum:iamental processes of policy making and the basic prin-
ciples of the associated disciplines such as economics, sociology, political 
science and so forth. If we are successful in this regard, the need for crash 
programs on the so-called hot issues such as the Trade Expansion Act or 
the wheat referendum will be greatly reduced. If y.;e were to have done a 
truly _effective education program on the 1963 Wheat Referendum we should 
have begun back in 1953; not three months before the referendum. 
One final word. One thing that has impressed me greatly in classroom 
teaching and I think it applies equally well to extension teaching is that we 
must get across to people that education is not a passive process. If we be-
lieve or if our people believe that all they're going to learn on a topic is what 
we tell them or what we can teach them within the limits of a seminar, then 
we might as well fold up our tents and go home. All we can do as educators 
is help them to open the doors to the storehouse of knowledge and hopefully 
stimulate them to delve more deeply in that storehouse. 
